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Contractual Interactions and the Uniform
Commercial Code
The Uniform Commercial Code has two basic purposes: to respond
fairly and flexibly to commercial realities,' and to serve as a uniform
body of rules that clearly governs commercial transactions. 2 This
Note contends that these two purposes are incompatible and argues
that the conflict between them can only be mitigated by abandoning
the attempt of modern contract law to establish a single system of law
applicable to all contracts.
The Note establishes a framework for analyzing the categories of
human interaction that result in contract formation. Having demon-
strated the wide variety of interactions by which contracts may be
formed, the Note examines the traditional judicial approaches to the
contracts created in these interactions. It focuses upon the unitary ap-
proach inherent in the doctrine of consideration and the Uniform
Commercial Code and finds that approach inadequate. The Note then
proposes a new approach that would permit judicial standards and
methods to vary according to the nature of the interaction that resulted
in the contract's formation.
I. Contractual Interactions and the Courts
All contracts for the sale of goods derive from an interaction between
two or more persons.3 Different forms of interaction result in different
kinds of contracts, each of which calls for a different judicial ap-
1. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a), (b), comment 1; Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's
New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law, 11 VILL. L.
REv. 213, 220-21 (1966).
2. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c); In re Automated Bookbinding Servs., Inc., 471 F.2d 546, 552
(4th Cir. 1972) (U.C.C.'s general purpose to create precise guide so businessmen may
predict results of their dealings).
3. An analysis of interpersonal interactions in a variety of contexts can be found in
the works of Erving Goffman. See E. GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS (1974) [hereinafter cited
as FRAME ANALYSIS]; E. GOFFMAN, ENCOUNTERS (1961) [hereinafter cited as ENCOUNTERS];
E. GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959) [hereinafter cited as
PRESENTATION OF SELF]. Although Goffman's works concentrate on face-to-face interactions,
there is no reason why his theories cannot be extended to include interactions that take
place at a distance.
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proach: interactions in which all parties are aware of the legal im-
plications of their actions require a "narrow" approach, in which a
court focuses upon the elements that the parties deliberately used to
signal their intentions; interactions in which the parties were not con-
centrating on the law require a "wide" judicial approach, in which a
court deduces the parties' intentions from all the circumstances of an
interaction.
A. The Categories of Interaction
Interactions that lead to contracts, like all human interactions, can
only be meaningful and maintained for a significant period of time if
the participants tacitly agree upon the interaction's characterization.
There must be agreement on two kinds of rules: rules of irrelevance,
which indicate which of the elements in the interaction are to be
ignored; and transformation rules, which indicate the weight and sig-
nificance of those elements deemed relevant to the transaction.4 The
system of rules that applies to an interaction is called its frame.5
In American society, three basic kinds of frames are available to the
participants in contractual interactions: status, trade, and legal. In the
status frame, contractual interactions are defined by each participant's
position or "status" in the community; participants expect that each
party will live up to the duties implicit in his status.6 In the trade
frame, the interaction is defined by the commercial transaction that
provides the impetus for the interaction; participants expect that the
special rules associated with commerce-and not with their personal
characteristics-will apply.7 In the legal frame, the interaction is defined
by the use of society's formal mechanisms for the creation of obliga-
tions enforceable by the state; the rules for the interaction are thus
governed by contract law.8
4. See ENCOUNTERS, supra note 3, at 19-34. The participants agree upon these rules by
exchanging socially provided cues. PRESENTATION OF SELF, supra note 3, at 9-10, 65.
5. ENCOUNTERS, supra note 3, at 20; FRAME ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 10-11. The frame
defines each interaction as a separate, internally coherent world; it supplies the spatial
and temporal limits of that world and provides the rules under which the elements of
the world interact. ENCOUNTERS, supra note 3, at 31-34.
6. Cf. M. GLUCKMAN, THE IDEAS IN BAROTSE JURISPRUDENCE 170-203 (1965) (describing
society in which trade relations organized within status frame).
7. Classical contract theory assumes the primacy of the trade frame. See L. FRIEDMAN
CONTRACT LAw IN AMERICA 20 (1965) (classical law of contract blind to details of subject
matter and person); Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Termn Economic Relations
Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 854, 862-65
(1978) (classical contract law treats as irrelevant identity of parties to transaction).
8. The three frames form a continuum. The status frame is the most basic and sets
minimum requirements for all interactions in a society. The trade frame focuses upon
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The existence of these three different frames for contractual inter-
actions complicates the function of courts. First, it makes a court's de-
termination of the legal consequences of a past interaction more
difficult. To discover the intentions of the participants and then pro-
tect their legitimate expectations, the court must consider how the
interaction was framed. The elements of the interaction by themselves
do not define the frame, because identical elements can appear in
interactions that have different frames.9 Furthermore, parties may at-
tempt to mislead the court. They may deliberately misframe an inter-
action by leading others to believe that one frame is operative, while
manipulating key elements in order to be able to assert later that
another frame had been agreed upon. 10
Second, a court must remain aware of a special prospective relation
to the legal frame. In evaluating a past interaction, the court reframes
it by imposing its own irrelevance and transformation rules." The
rules that it chooses define the legal frame for participants in similar
interactions in the future. 12
B. Judicial Approaches to Contractual Interactions
These two functions of a court-discovering the intentions and ex-
pectations of the parties retrospectively and determining the legal frame
for similar situations prospectively-result in conflicting approaches to
contractual interactions.' The court will define a more useful legal
commercial interactions between participants. The legal frame is the most specialized,
for it focuses upon the legal implications, rather than the social setting or the com-
mercial function, of the contractual interaction. The distinction among the three frames
is largely one of emphasis.
9. The significance of identical elements in different frames will depend upon the
relevance and transformation rules that define a particular frame. See p. 1397 supra; FRAME
ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 201-300.
10. Examples of attempts at misframing contracts abound. For example, an interaction
based upon status may for tax reasons try to pass as one based upon trade or law; a
family gift may be characterized as a sale to avoid gift tax or as a legally enforceable loan
to secure the donor a bad debt deduction when the loan is not repaid. See A. LEFF,
SWINDLING AND SELLING (1976) (other examples); cf. FRAME ANALYSIS, supra note 3, at 83-
123 (examples of "fabrications"-practical jokes, swindles, espionage-in which individuals
induce false beliefs in others about what is occurring).
11. The particular relevance and transformation rules chosen by a court will depend
upon the applicable law-precedential and statutory-by which it is bound.
12. Within its jurisdiction, a court's definition of the legal frame governing an in-
teraction will influence the framing of future interactions by the participants and, to the
extent that the court's decisions have precedential value, the interpretation of future
interactions by other courts.
13. The characterization of narrow and wide judicial approaches that follows draws
heavily on the work of Duncan Kennedy. See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private
Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). Kennedy describes two kinds of legal
forms: one "favors the use of clearly defined, highly administrable, general rules"; the
other supports "the use of equitable standards producing ad hoc decisions with relatively
little precedential value." Id. at 1685.
1398
Contractual Interactions
frame if it adopts a "narrow" approach, considering a minimum of
elements in the interaction and clearly establishing the weight accorded
each element. The clearer the prevailing legal frame, the more easily
the participants in an interaction can use that frame to indicate their
intentions and the more predictably courts will resolve the contractual
conflicts before them. 14 A narrow approach, however, limits the in-
formation available to the court, thus making it difficult for the court
to ascertain any unusual aspects of a particular interaction.1 5 Moreover,
the narrower the approach, the more readily elements of the legal
frame can become "mere" formalities that are exploitable by legally
astute parties.' 6
A court will evaluate a past contract more fairly and more accurately
if it adopts a "wide" approach and thus examines the entire interaction
and all aspects of the context in which it arose."7 Such an approach
will allow the court to give effect to all the elements that influenced
the parties, and thus to adjust its standards flexibly to the frame that
the parties used and to police against deliberate misframings. But be-
cause a wide approach prevents courts from defining clear legal rules,
the court's resolution of contractual disputes will be less predictable
and participants will have less guidance in planning future interactions.
The advantages and disadvantages of the narrow and wide judicial
approaches can be illustrated by an examination of two systems of con-
tract law that coexisted in the United States in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries: penal bonds under seal' and fair price.' 9 In
evaluating a contract set forth in a sealed penal bond, the court was
limited to specific questions: had the document been sealed; had the
conditions that it recited been met? Because the system narrowly cir-
cumscribed a court's review, judicial reactions were predictable, and
freedom of contract was protected.2 0 That same narrowness, however,
also led to abuses as the seal degenerated into a formality that stood
14. Cf. id. at 1697-98 (casting contract formalities as rules provides incentive to parties
to learn rules and use them to communicate intentions precisely); id. at 1688-89 (use of
rules restrains official arbitrariness and promotes certainty).
15. Cf. id. at 1689 (rules may sacrifice precision in achieving objectives behind rules).
16. Cf. id. at 1699-1700 (use of rules may intensify disparity in bargaining power be-
tween legally astute and legally inexperienced).
17. Cf. id. at 1688 (use of standard requires judge to assess facts of particular situation
in terms of social values embodied in standards).
18. W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAWv 61 (1975); Horwitz, The His-
torical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 917, 927-29 (1974); Simpson,
The Penal Bond with Conditional Defeasance, 82 LAW Q. REV. 392 (1966).
19. W. NELSON, supra note 18, at 58-63; Horwitz, supra note 18, at 923-27, 935-36.
20. W. NELSON, supra note 18, at 61-62 (penal bonds made it possible to use non-
customary measures of exchange); Horwitz, supra note 18, at 927-28 (penal bonds allowed
businessmen to "conduct business transactions free from the equalizing tendencies of
courts and juries").
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between the court and the economic and social substance of a contract.2 1
Most contracts that did not use a seal were analyzed within the system
of fair price, a system that granted recognition to contractual provisions
only if those provisions met local community standards of fairness.2 2
This system facilitated the policing of abuses, but only at the cost of
making the enforcement of agreements uncertain.2 3
Despite their opposing approaches, the systems of bond under seal
and of fair price coexisted; each was applied to a different kind of
contract in an area in which its advantages were maximized and its
dangers limited. Commercial professionals, for whom the benefits of
judicial predictability were greatest and the dangers of the abuse of
formalities least, used the seal.2 4 Consumers and local trades people
usually did not use the seal; their transactions were judged according
to the system of fair price. This flexibility of contract law, which im-
plicitly recognized the various categories of contractual interaction,
became impossible with the adoption of unitary systems, which sought
to apply the same law to all contracts25 and thus to render irrelevant
the nature of the parties to a contract.
II. The Unitary Contract System
One important characteristic of modem contract law is its ongoing
attempt to devise a single, unitary system that avoids the disadvantages
of the wide and narrow judicial approaches without sacrificing their
advantages. Both the doctrine of consideration and the Uniform Com-
21. F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS 578-79 (2d ed. 1970). Courts, however, were
unwilling to forfeit all supervision of contracts. See Simpson, supra note 18, at 415-21
(courts reluctant to enforce penal clauses in which penalties out of proportion to actual
damages suffered). Courts of equity quickly devised doctrines that enabled them to
provide relief for parties that were victims of the purely formal aspects of the seal. See
Horwitz, supra note 18, at 928; Simpson, supra note 18, at 415-18.
22. See Horwitz, supra note 18, at 920-32.
23. The system of fair price depended upon the existence of clear community standards
and upon society's willingness to use these standards to limit freedom of contract. See id.
at 935-36. The existence of objective, intrinsic values that society could recognize was
undermined by the development of a market economy in which prices fluctuated. See id.
at 946-47.
24. See id. at 928.
25. See G. GLMoE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 45-46 (1977). The courts' decision
to subject the contracts of both professionals and nonprofessionals to the same law was
probably influenced by the growing centrality of commerce within society and its im-
pingement upon an increasing number of nonprofessionals. In addition, the movement
to a unitary system paralleled a larger cultural movement. The medieval period and the
Renaissance allowed for multiple truths-for example, truths of reason and of faith, of
law and of equity. Later periods strove for a single truth, whether it be the rationalistic
systems of the Enlightenment or the dynamic, historical systems of the nineteenth cen-
tury. See M. FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS 54-63, 217-29, 236-49 (1973).
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mercial Code represent unitary systems based upon simplifying assump-
tions about contractual interactions. Although these two systems differ
in several important respects, they fail for analogous reasons, and their
failures illustrate the misconceptions that underlie the attempt to unify
contract law.
A. The Doctrine of Consideration
The unitary approach of the doctrine of consideration was based
upon the simplifying assumption that all contracts represented com-
mercial exchanges. 20 As a result, an explicit agreement between the
parties defining the exchange in which they were engaged became the
legal requirement for the creation of a contract.2 7 In solving a con-
tractual dispute, courts could thus take a narrow approach to con-
tracts; they needed only to determine whether the exchange cited in
the contract had taken place.2 8 Because an exchange-unlike a seal-
was assumed to be not an arbitrary legal requirement, but rather the
very essence of a contract,2 9 the dangers of a narrow approach pre-
sumably were avoided. Courts were free to adopt a wide approach for
the limited purpose of ensuring that the contract represented an ex-
change intended by both parties.30 Once that was determined, however,
26. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 20, 21 n.* (classical contract law roughly coextensive
with free market; core concept underlying consideration is that enforceable contracts
must be exchanges). The doctrine protected its assumption by decreeing that dealings
among individuals whose relations could not be reduced to simple exchanges could not
lead to contracts. See F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, supra note 21, at 120-28 (citing cases in
which actions for reimbursement for work done by relatives were denied on ground that
work must have been done for love and not money); Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?: Con-
flicts of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAw. 35, 36 (1966) (fiduciary responsibility
of director to corporation requires that any contract between them is voidable at insistence
of corporation or its shareholders without regard to intrinsic fairness).
27. The validity of a contract depended upon the parties' explicit identification of an
exchange of promise and consideration.
[I]t is the essence of a consideration, that, by the terms of the agreement, it is given
and accepted as the motive or inducement of the promise. Conversely, the promise
must be made and accepted as the conventional motive or inducement for furnishing
the consideration. The root of the whole matter is the relation of reciprocal conven-
tional inducement, each for the other, between consideration and promise.
0. HOLMS, THE COMMON LAW 293-94 (1881) (emphasis added).
28. If that exchange had not taken place, the exchange itself provided the proper
measure of damages. The rules for calculating damages upon breach sought to recreate
the original exchange without paying attention to the parties' actual situation. They there-
fore adopted an expectation, rather than a reliance or restitution, measure for damages.
See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52,
56-57 (1936).
29. See I S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 100 (1920) (doctrine of consideration
relates, not to form, but rather to substance of contract).
30. See id. at § 115 (describing balance that doctrine of consideration sought between
freedom of contract and court supervision).
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an inquiry into details about the contractual interaction was not neces-
sary; no matter how framed, all interactions were assumed to result in
an enunciation of the transaction's single, core exchange.
This attempt at a grand synthesis failed."' Business transactions do
not always take the form of an explicit exchange,32 and therefore the
doctrine's emphasis upon exchange was a legal requirement, not a re-
flection of commercial necessity. A court had no unproblematic way of
knowing whether an exchange reflected commercial realities. If a court
unquestioningly accepted the parties' formal statements, it was open
to the dangers of the narrow judicial approach; without some inquiry
into the details of the interaction that led to the contract, the court
could not know whether the legal implications of the contractual
provisions reflected the parties' intentions, were inadvertent, or were
the result of unfair manipulation by the more legally astute party. If
a contract failed to cite an exchange, the court's only option was to
declare the contract invalid.33 This produced harsh results and pro-
moted misframings, because exchanges that had a valid commercial
basis could fail to meet the threshold of legal enforceability. If the
court chose to verify the formal statements by making an independent
determination of the parties' exchange, the decision was open to all the
dangers of the wide judicial approach. Because the court had little in-
formation about the interaction that created the contract, the prob-
ability of unpredictable overruling of the parties' intentions was high.
Faced with such problems, the courts devised a number of techniques
and supplementary doctrines that enabled them to protect the parties'
legitimate commercial expectations and to police against abuses, while
pretending to respect a contract's statement of its exchange.34 The
resulting legal complexity deprived the basic premise of the doctrine
of consideration-that all contracts can be reduced to a simple ex-
change-of all plausibility.
31. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 57 (1974).
32. See F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, supra note 21, at 337-38 (difficulties in gaining
recognition of requirement and output contracts because no clear exchange defined).
33. See id. at 155-65 (citing cases declaring contracts void for lack of definiteness).
34. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, supra note 31, at 71-72 (commercial reliance protected by
doctrine of promissory estoppel); id. at 73-75 (person who confers unbargained-for benefit
protected by doctrine of quasi-contract); Kennedy, supra note 13, at 1700 (courts pro-
fessing adherence to clear contract rules adjust equities by exploiting ambiguities in rules
and by developing contradictory rules and counterrules to govern same area); Kessler &
Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedont of Contract: A
Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REv. 401, 448 (1964) (such techniques as estoppel and
implied subsidiary promises used to create equivalent of duty to bargain in good faith).
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B. The Uniform Commercial Code
1. Llewellyn's Plan and Its Flaws
The Uniform Commercial Code also adopts a unitary approach, but
attempts to avoid the weaknesses of the doctrine of consideration by
recognizing the multiplicity of forms that commercial transactions can
assume. The Code does not require that a transaction take any specific
form, such as an exchange, because Karl Llewellyn, the chief architect
of the Code, believed that a transaction in its natural commercial form
possesses a single, immanent legal interpretation. In settling a con-
tractual dispute, courts must make that interpretation explicit and can
do so only by paying close attention to the transaction in its com-
mercial context.35
If Llewellyn's assumption-that a commercially sensitive court could
find clear, precise solutions to all transactional legal problems-were
valid, and if the Code fully embodied that assumption, the Code's uni-
tary approach would succeed. Parties acting in good faith would be
able to concentrate upon their commercial business, knowing that a
court's interpretation of their contracts would be predictable and in
accord with commercial expectations. Simultaneously, the courts, freed
from the technicalities of the doctrine of consideration and directed to
consider commercial reality, would be in an excellent position to police
misframings and ensure general fairness.
Llewellyn's assumption, however, is not valid. First, defining the
context within which a contract arose is not always a simple task.36
Second, even if a court can define that context, the context may not
present a well-developed body of commercial practices upon which
the court can draw for its interpretation.37 Finally, even if a court can
associate a contract with a body of commercial practices, those practices
may not speak to the problem facing the court because commercial and
legal emphases often differ.3 8
35. Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27
STAN. L. Rav. 621, 626-27 (1975).
36. The major difficulty is that the parties to the contract often belong to different
trades with different expectations and practices. See, e.g., Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 92
Wash. 2d 40, 49, 593 P.2d 1308, 1313 (1979) (trade-usage limits liability between film
processors, but not between processors and retail customers).
37. Because most cases that reach the courts are not in highly developed areas of
commerce, see L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 39-40, 57-58, 201 (Wisconsin cases reflect
marginal transactions and litigants-small, novel businesses, amateur businessmen), it is
unlikely that a significant body of trade practices will exist.
38. See Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am.
Soc. RFv. 55, 60 (1963) (businessmen attend more to describing performance than to
planning for contingencies or defective performances, or to obtaining legal enforceability
of their contracts).
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The Code seems implicitly to recognize these problems, in that it does
not refer courts solely to commercial practices, as Llewellyn's assump-
tion would require. Instead, the Code both contains a multitude of
provisions that detail the consequences of specified actions39 and per-
mits parties to use formalities to indicate their intentions more pre-
cisely.40 This internal contradiction within the Code reopens the
possibility of a clash between the commercial and legal implications of
a contractual term, and hence between wide and narrow judicial ap-
proaches. If a Code provision contradicts commercial practices, 41 courts
must choose either a narrow approach that follows the Code but may
unfairly deny commercial expectations, or a wide approach that follows
commercial usage but may increase judicial unpredictability.42
Both the doctrine of consideration and the Code assume that com-
mercial contexts can provide answers to legal questions: the doctrine
presumes that the parties will provide the answers; the Code hopes that
courts will find them. This change of emphasis, however, is insignif-
icant. By shifting the burden of translating a commercial understanding
into a legal one from the parties to the courts, the Code has merely
traded the dangers of the narrow approach for the difficulties of the
wide approach. The major conceptual flaw-the assumption that all
contracts can be treated alike-has survived.
2. The Flaws Illustrated: Section 2-207
The failure of the Uniform Commercial Code to devise a unitary
system that avoids the dangers of both the narrow and wide judicial
approaches is readily illustrated by an examination of the problems that
beset specific Code sections. Section 2-207, 43 the section governing the
39. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-319 (use of F.O.B. and F.A.S. terms), 2-327 (incidents of sale
on approval), 2-503 (manner of seller's tender), 2-507 (effect of seller's tender).
40. The Code's major formality is the signed writing. Writing is required in certain
situations, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201 (Statute of Frauds), and judicial scrutiny of it is limited,
e.g., U.C.C. § 2-202 (parol evidence rule).
41. For example, consider the position of a court in the following situation. The trade
practice in a given industry is not to give implied warranties to the buyer. See, e.g.,
Barron & Dunfee, Two Decades of 2-207: Review and Revision, 24 CLmv. ST. L. Ray. 171,183 (1975) (sale of seeds). The contract governing a transaction in this industry therefore
contains no provisions that deal with warranties. The Code, however, supplies implied
warranties in the absence of specific disclaimers. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315. If a con-
tractual dispute over warranties arises, which governs: trade practices or the Code?
42. Similarly, if parties use formalities, the courts must accept the formalities unques-
tioningly and thus open the way to the abuses of the narrow judicial approach, or brave
the dangers of the judicial arbitrariness of the wide approach and attempt to distinguish
proper from manipulative uses of the formalities.
43. U.C.C. § 2-207.
1404
Vol. 89: 1396, 1980
Contractual Interactions
"battle of the forms, ' '4 4 is designed to bring the law into greater
harmony with commercial practices by abrogating the "mirror-image"
rule of contract formation.45 This rule, that a contract is invalid unless
offer and acceptance contain only identical terms, results in judicial
predictability, but only at the cost of preventing realization of legitimate
commercial expectations. 46
The Code attempts to remedy the harsh results of the doctrine of
consideration. Abrogation of the mirror-image rule, however, creates an
additional problem: once a court finds that a contract has been formed,
all of the terms to which the parties have not explicitly agreed must be
supplied. The section 2-207 solution to the problem combines the
narrow and wide judicial approaches by directing courts to rely upon
the parties' writings whenever possible, but permitting them to con-
sider the parties' conduct if necessary.47
Section 2-207 fails in its attempt to resolve the battle of the forms.
First, although the decision to use either the parties' writing or their
conduct as the operative set of facts will have a dramatic impact upon
interpretation of the contract,48 judicial attempts to provide guidelines
for that decision have failed. 49 Second, the dangers of both the narrow
44. The "battle of the forms" occurs when buying and selling firms exchange discrepant
forms and each form is designed to give its sender the more favorable legal position.
45. See Barron & Dunfee, supra note 41, at 175-77.
46. Under common law, if the forms differed in any aspect, however unimportant, no
contract was formed. See, e.g., Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216 N.Y. 310, 110
N.E. 619 (1915). If the forms differed, and then the market unexpectedly changed, this
rule of law permitted the defeat of commercial expectations by enabling the party sub-
ject to an unfavorable contract to avoid fulfillment of his obligation. If the forms differed
but performance followed, the last outstanding offer was deemed to be accepted as a
binding contract, so that the party who sent in his form last achieved the terms that he
desired. This "last shot" approach could be unfair, because the exact timing of the ex-
change of forms could be either accidental or manipulable, and because often neither
party read the other's forms. See Macaulay, supra note 38, at 59.
47. The priority given writing is meant to minimize judicial arbitrariness: judges are
to prefer terms composed by the parties themselves and to choose among those terms
according to previously established rules. The ability to look behind inadequate writings
to conduct allows the courts to take account of commercial realities. Cf. Taylor, U.C.C.
Section 2-207: An Integration of Legal Abstractions and Transactional Reality, 46 U. CIN.
L. REv. 419, 422 (1977) (Code combines a "bargain-oriented" and a "conduct-oriented"
approach).
48. For example, assume that a seller offers its goods without warranties, the buyer
responds with an order form specifying warranties, and the seller ships the goods. If the
contract is deemed to be established by the parties' writings, the order form will be the
acceptance. The buyer's warranty terms will then probably not be part of the contract,
because they will be deemed material variants or terms objected to in advance. See U.C.C.
§ 2-207(2). If the contract is deemed to be established by the parties' conduct, the
implied warranties of the Code enter as supplementary terms. See U.C.C. § 2-2073).
49. Attempts to devise general rules have led to holdings that subvert the purpose of
the sections. Compare Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (Ist Cir. 1962) (ac-
ceptance is conditional if it contains any material deviations from offer) with Dorton v.
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and wide approaches exist under section 2-207. Emphasis upon writing
may result in decisions based upon "mere" legal formalisms that have
no counterparts in commercial practiceso and that can be manipulated
by the legally astute.51 Yet reliance upon conduct may produce decisions
that are unpredictable and to some extent arbitrary.52
Collins 8: Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972) (even if it includes materially dif-
ferent terms, reply is conditional acceptance only if expressly conditional). Roto-Lith
subverts section 2-207 by permitting a return to the "last shot" doctrine and renders sub-
section (2)(b) meaningless. See Barron & Dunfee, supra note 41, at 181. Dorton sub-
verts section 2-207 by focusing upon a specific "magic phrase" and thus making the
validity of a contract depend, not upon commercially significant events, but rather upon
the exact language in forms. See Murray, Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code:
Another Word About Incipient Unconscionability, 39 U. PIrr. L. Riv. 597, 637-38 (1978).
Attempts to make individual determinations in specific situations have led to analyses
that are analytically incoherent. See, e.g., Construction Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins,
Inc., 404 F.2d 505, 509 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921 (1969) (holding that jury
could find that reply, which was "predicated" upon certain modifications, did not create
contract and that subsequent conduct created contract under § 2-207(3), but that warranty
limitations in offeree's reply were effective because offeror had not objected). Although the
outcome in Construction Aggregates is correct, the decision is analytically incoherent; fail-
ure to object is revelant only to contracts formed under subsection (1), and the implied war-
ranties of the Code govern in contracts under subsection (3) unless excluded by the parties'
writings. Cf. R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 3 .06[4 ] (1980) (criticizing Construction Aggregates for reviving "last
shot" rule and binding offeror but not counter-offeror).
50. For example, by favoring the offeror's form, section 2-207 gives significance to the
exact sequence in which negotiations are conducted, see U.C.C. § 2-207(l), (2), a factor
that may have no commercial meaning, see Taylor, supra note 47, at 447; Note, In Defense
of the Battle of the Forms: Curing the "First Shot" Flaw in Section 2-207 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 384, 384, 389-90 (1973). Distinctions among offers,
counter-offers, and acceptances are particularly arbitrary when more than two forms are
exchanged. Compare CBS, Inc. v. Auburn Plastics, Inc., 67 A.D.2d 811, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d
50, 51 (1979) (when forms exchanged in order of price quotation, purchase order, acknowl-
edgment of order, contract is created by exchange of purchase order and acknowledgment;
terms in price quotation not in contract) with Coast Trading Co. v. Parmac, Inc., 21
Wash. App. 896, 907-08, 587 P.2d 1071, 1077-78 (1978) (purchase order read in light of
price quotation that inspired it; terms in price quotation part of contract).
51. The most blatant attempts at manipulation include the mechanical insertion into
standard forms of clauses either limiting acceptance to the offeror's terms or making the
acceptance conditional upon assent to the offeree's additional or different terms. Com-
mentators advise the use of such clauses. See, e.g., Davenport, How to Handle Sales of
Goods: The Problem of Conflicting Purchase Orders and Acceptances and New Concepts
in Contract Law, 19 Bus. LAW. 75, 80, 88 (1963); Lipman, On Winning the Battle of the
Forms: An Analysis of Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 Bus. LAw. 789,
802-04 (1969). Courts give such clauses effect. See, e.g., C. Itoh & Co. (America) Inc. v.
Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1235-36 (7th Cir. 1977); Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp., 20
Cal. 3d 90, 101-02, 569 P.2d 751, 759, 141 Cal. Rptr. 157, 165 (1977).
52. Emphasis upon conduct may lead to judicial unpredictability; although conduct
can indicate whether a deal exists, it does not necessarily indicate the terms of the deal.
Parties usually know whether they intend to perform, and their conduct will reflect this
knowledge. They may not have thought, however, about the details of performance or the
allocation of unexpected risks, or they may believe that the expected cost of the dangers
of leaving such issues unresolved is less than the transaction costs of resolving them. See
Lipman, supra note 51, at 790-91; Macaulay, supra note 38, at 64.
U.C.C. § 2-207(3) tries to resolve this problem by requiring that courts derive the terms
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In sum, section 2-207 presents in microcosm the history and problems
of the Uniform Commercial Code. The section and the Code were
written because of dissatisfaction with the doctrine of consideration;
both are committed to creating a simple and flexible legal doctrine
based upon commercial reality. Yet both draw back from a full com-
mitment. Because of the fear that commercial standards are too mut-
able, they provide detailed rules to guide judicial decision. These rules
inevitably transform both Code and section from businessman's law to
lawyer's law. This tension between purpose (reflection of commercial
reality) and result (a complex legal system) is not fatal. Good judges
can manipulate section 2-207 and the entire Code to achieve com-
mercially correct results, just as good judges manipulated the com-
plexities of the doctrine of consideration. 3 But reliance upon judicial
dexterity further complicates the law as judges make ever finer distinc-
tions. Unless the Code alters its basic attitude toward contracts, it will
ultimately suffer the same fate as the doctrine of consideration.
III. Toward a Nonunitary Theory of Contract
Current law fails in its quest for both predictability and responsive-
ness to commercial reality because it ignores the variety of contexts in
which contracts may arise. An examination of the different forms of
contractual interactions suggests that courts should tailor their ap-
of contracts established by conduct from the parties' writings and the provisions of the
Code. If subsection (3) applies, the writings are incomplete or otherwise inadequate.
Reliance upon the Code is likely to be arbitrary. Parties who left the very existence of
their contract to be inferred from conduct are unlikely to have taken Code provisions
into account. Potential arbitrariness can be mitigated by judges drawing on trade usage.
See U.C.C. § 1-205. Resort to trade usage, however, can compound the uncertainty in-
herent in resort to conduct. The courts would have to define the relevant trades, deal
with the problem of contracts between members of different trades, and determine the
relation of trade usage to the express terms of contracts.
Problems in reconciling narrow and wide judicial approaches similar to those associated
with U.C.C. § 2-207 beset other sections of the Code. For example, reconciliation gen-
erates problems in the interpretation of U.C.C. § 1-205, the section that directs courts to
rely on "course of dealing and usage of trade" and that lies at the heart of the Code's
shift of emphasis to a wide approach responsive to commercial realities. See Kirst, Usage
of Trade and Course of Dealing: Subversion of the UCC Theory, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 811
(conflict between "narrow" interpretation of § 1-205(4) as parol evidence rule to give
primacy to writings, and "wide" interpretation allowing possible distortion of party
intentions). Similar problems attend the Code's provisions on warranty obligations. See
Note, Legal Control on Varranty Liability Limitation Under the Uniforn Commercial
Code, 63 V.. L. REv. 791 (1977) (clash between "narrow" emphasis on writings of § 2-316(2)
(requirements for excluding warranties), and "wide" concern with commercial realities of
§ 2-719(2) (requirements for limiting remedies)).
53. Cf. Kennedy, supra note 13, at 1700 (under doctrine of consideration, rule and
counterrule allowed skillful judge to police equity, but source of confusion and bad law
if judge not skillful).
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proach according to the frame within which the contract was created5 4
The failure of both the doctrine of consideration and the Uniform
Commercial Code to utilize a unitary approach to all contracts suc-
cessfully provides additional support for a nonunitary system.
A. The Proposal
A key step in formulating a nonunitary system is selection of a cri-
terion for choosing the appropriate approach for a particular contract.
No single judicial approach, however chosen, can both fully reflect
commercial reality and yield totally predictable results. Instead, the
criterion must satisfy two humbler requirements: (1) it must provide
guidelines by which a court can associate any contract with the judicial
approach that best respects the parties' own compromise between com-
mercial flexibility and legal certainty; (2) it must provide a mechanism
by which parties can indicate the approach that they wish a court to
apply to their contract.
The best criterion for a court to use in choosing between the ap-
plication of a wide or narrow approach is the frame of the contractual
interaction by which the disputed contract was formed. It is not neces-
sary, however, to distinguish between all three of the possible frames;5
the primary distinction for a court should be whether the contract was
created within a legal or a nonlegal frame. If a contract was created
within the legal frame, the parties by hypothesis were interested in
determining in advance the legal implications of their contract. The
law should assist them by providing clear formalities that the parties
can use to specify their agreement precisely and by mandating a narrow
judicial approach that focuses upon those formalities. If both parties
were aware of the formalities' significance at the time the contract was
formed, a court resolving a subsequent dispute needs little flexibility
54. The concept of alternative legal systems that mandate different rules for contracts
created in different frames is not entirely new to the U.C.C.: the Code already distin-
guishes in certain situations between the contracts of merchants and those of non-
merchants. See U.C.C. § 2-104; Newell, The Merchant of Article 2, 7 VAL. L. Rav. 307
(1973) (listing sections of Code affected by merchant/nonmerchant distinction). Courts
also apply identical formal doctrines differently to different parties. See Childres & Spitz,
Status in the Law of Contract, 47 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1972) (application of parol evidence
rule). This proposal simply makes a more systematic and more extensive attempt to char-
acterize contracts on the basis of the context in which they were created. Whereas the
Code applies its distinction only in certain sections, the proposal would have the entire
interpretation of a contract turn on its frame. Furthermore, whereas the Code implicitly
recognizes the inappropriateness of imposing legal forms on nonprofessionals, the proposal
would avoid imposition of legal forms on commercial professionals as well. It would
allow all parties to structure their contractual interactions as they wished and would then
adapt its legal analysis accordingly.
55. See p. 1397 sutra.
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or additional information in order to reach a result that is both pre-
dictable and in accord with commercial reality.
If a contract was not created in a legal frame, the parties' intentions
cannot be determined by a legal analysis of the formal aspects of the
contract.50 Because the parties did not use legal formalities to specify
their intentions, only a thorough understanding of the entire context
of the contractual interaction will enable a court to reach an equitable
decision. A wide judicial approach is required in order to provide access
to all relevant information. The primary danger of a wide approach-
unpredictable judicial holdings-could be mitigated by directing courts
to continue to give considerable weight to the parties' writings 7 The
court, however, would also consider other relevant information-for
example, trade usage in the case of a contract arising in the trade frame,
or expectational interest of the parties in the case of a contract arising
in the status frame.5s From all this information, the court could de-
termine the intentions of the parties and the expectational interests to
which they have a legitimate claim.59
B. The Proposal Applied
The characterization of a contract as legal or nonlegal should be
based upon an objective, easily ascertainable fact: if each party to the
interaction was represented by a lawyer, 60 a strong, but rebuttable,
56. A legal analysis of any contract in which one of the parties was not aware of the
law only encourages misframing. It is even easier for a legally astute party to manipulate
results if he is aware that the contract will be subject to a highly formal legal analysis.
57. The danger of judicial unpredictability in interpreting contracts not written in a
legal frame can only be mitigated, not fully avoided. Given that the parties did not plan
their writings with a full understanding of their legal implications, a narrow approach
focusing only upon the writings is even less likely to reach the results the parties in-
tended. The precision of a narrow legal analysis creates a misleading aura of accuracy.
The wide approach in this context provides all the certainty and predictability that the
original contract allows. Cf. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 1094bl2-28 (D. Ross trans.
1915) (necessary to look for precision only so far as nature of subject permits).
58. Determining whether a contract was created within a trade or status frame is not
crucial. The trier of fact should use a wide approach to contracts created within either
frame. Disputes about the frame in which a contract was created would generally involve
questions of the relevance of some trade or commercial usage. In that situation, the party
asserting the relevance of the usage should have the burden of showing that the parties
would reasonably expect the disputed usage to apply.
59. The court's decision will have limited precedential value because it will depend
almost entirely on the unique facts of particular contractual interaction. If the decision
has any precedential value, then the court is defining a new legal frame for the future
and all the problems of the narrow frame will recur.
60. Each party would have to be independently represented by a lawyer in the specific
interaction that led to the contract: an exchange by laymen of forms drafted by lawyers
would not suffice. Moreover, the provision by one party of lawyers for both sides would
be inadequate; otherwise, the law would be reduced to a mere formality.
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presumption should arise that the interaction took place within the
legal frame.,' If each party was not represented by a lawyer, the party
asserting that the contract should be interpreted under strict legal
rules should bear the burden of establishing that it was the result of
an interaction in the legal frame. Because of the expense of retaining
lawyers,62 many, perhaps most, contracts are created in nonlegal frames.
Courts will take a wide approach to such contracts, thereby subjecting
them to the risk of judicial unpredictability. The proposal, however,
subjects these contracts to fewer risks than the present Code. Currently,
contracts created in nonlegal frames run not only the risks of the wide
approach, but also the risks of inappropriate application of the narrow
approach. Moreover, even courts that appropriately apply a wide ap-
proach may be reluctant to apply the approach wholeheartedly because
of fear that they will set precedents that they will be forced to apply to
contracts written in the legal frame.
Full implementation of the proposed system would require a new
commercial code. Such a code would consist of three parts: an intro-
ductory part providing definitions and rules for determining the nature
of the interaction that led to a contract, and two principal parts describ-
ing alternative legal systems to govern the two major kinds of contracts.
The first system, designed for contracts created in the legal frame,
would be technical and precise. 3 The second system, designed for con-
tracts created in the nonlegal frame, would set forth a short number
of standards that triers of fact should apply. 64
61. The presumption would place both the burden of coming forward with evidence
and the burden of persuasion on the party claiming that the interaction had not taken
place in a legal frame.
62. The expense could be minimized by having parties who regularly dealt with each
other negotiate overriding contracts covering entire classes of transactions. See Lipman,
supra note 51, at 791. The requirement that lawyers be involved in the interaction that
led to the contract would be satisfied if lawyers negotiated the overriding contract and
indicated its duration and the kind of goods it covered.
Some additional expense is inevitable in the creation of contracts in the legal frame,
because becoming conscious of the legal implications of a transaction is a step not strictly
required for the transaction to take place. The expense has the useful cautionary effect,
however, of impressing upon the parties the legal importance of their agreement.
63. It might, for example, include a version of the mirror image rule of contract
formation and a rigorous parol evidence rule.
64. These standards would consist of such general rules of interpretation as good faith
and unconscionability. The proposed system can be illustrated by examining its application
to the cases, decided under U.C.C. § 2-207, which were discussed above. See note 49 suPra.
Because lawyers were not involved in the exchange of forms in either Roto-Lith, Ltd. v.
F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (Ist Cir. 1962), or Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453
F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972), these cases, which were decided as matters of law, should be
decided as matters of fact. Rolo-Lith involved the failure of an emulsion bought for use
in the manufacture of cellophane adhesive. Which party will bear the cost of that failure
should be determined on the basis of such facts as whether the buyer had relied upon
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Even if commercial law were not altered so extensively as this pro-
posal would require, courts could still use the analysis suggested by this
Note in deciding cases under the existing Code. The Code includes
both narrow and wide judicial approaches,65 without providing sys-
tematic guidance for selection of which approach to apply. This Note
suggests a principled way in which a court can decide which element
to emphasize in any given contract. For example, under section 2-207,
a court may have to decide whether a given reply signified acceptance.
This should be analyzed as a question of fact., 6 If the parties were
represented by lawyers, they should be deemed to have been aware of
the contents of each other's writings, and their negotiation postures
should be treated as meaningful. The court should therefore adopt a
narrow approach and concentrate upon the parties' writings and the
process of their negotiations 7 If the parties were not represented by
lawyers, the court should not assume that they focused upon the precise
contents of their writings. The court should therefore adopt a wide
approach to determine how the parties, in their commercial and social
the expertise of, or upon representations by, the seller and upon customs of the trade.
Dorton involved a motion to stay pending arbitration. In that case, the relevant questions
of fact would be whether arbitration was customary in the industry and whether there
were any reasons to believe that the contracts at issue were not meant to follow ordinary
industry practices.
In Construction Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921 (1969), Ebasco Servs., Inc, v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.,
460 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Pa. 1978), and Ebasco Servs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light
Co., 402 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Pa 1975), lawyers were involved in the negotiations. These
cases therefore should be subjected to strict legal analysis. In Construction Aggregates,
some analogue of the mirror-image rule might well apply; if so, the offeror would be held
to have accepted the counteroffer. In Ebasco, the parties entered into a written contract
limiting the offeree's warranty obligations after an initial exchange of forms and after
performance was almost complete. The court went to great lengths to avoid section 2-207
and thus to reach the correct result of honoring the parties' written agreement. The
court should simply have held that by reaching their agreement, the parties, advised by
their lawyers, indicated that they did not wish to rely on whatever rights had been
conferred upon them by the initial exchange of forms and the project's near completion.
65. Compare U.C.C. § 2-207(1), (2) (narrow approach) with U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (wide
approach); compare U.C.C. § 2-201 (narrow approach) and U.C.C. § 2-202 (same) with
U.C.C. § 2-204 (wide approach) and U.C.C. § 2-206 (same).
66. See Murray, supra note 49, at 602 (arguing question should be matter of fact under
present Code).
67. The application of this principle can be illustrated by considering the holding in
Construction Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 921 (1969). See notes 49 & 64 supra. In Construction Aggregates, the
corporations' legal departments were involved. Thus, the court should have decided that,
in a situation in which lawyers were presumably reading replies carefully, a reply that
proposed substantial modifications was a counteroffer. The telephone conversation that
discussed the proposed modifications could be treated as an acceptance of the counteroffer
as further modified in the conversation. This analysis would lead to the court's result,
but would avoid the court's conceptual difficulties.
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setting, likely understood the exchange of writings. 68 If courts apply
this kind of analysis systematically and openly on appropriate occasions,
they can begin to achieve the more equitable and commercially realistic
results made possible by the proposed system.
68. The court should decide whether an offeree viewed a written offer as a legal offer
of a precise contract or as a commercial order involving the customary terms in its in-
dustry. The likelihood that an offer will be interpreted as a commercial order means that
the courts should not enforce unusual terms in offers unless the offeror has made them
the subject of specific negotiations. On the other hand, the offeror is entitled to presume
that any version of customary terms is acceptable. Similarly, courts should not give
effect to unusual terms in offeree's forms, either by enforcing them or by using them to
prevent the formation of a contract, unless the offeree has made them the subject of
specific negotiations. Cf. Taylor, supra note 47, at 436-38 (if exchanged forms conflict, use
U.C.C. §§ 2-201(1), (2), 2-302 to obtain terms consistent with prior dealing and trade
usage).
This analysis suggests that in a nonlegal frame, an offer that, except for explicitly
negotiated terms, included only terms commonly used in the industry, would be deemed
accepted if the offeree returned any writing-whatever its terms-that had the commercial
appearance of an acceptance or if the offeree performed. If the offer contained terms that
were not commonly used in the industry, a reply that did not specifically agree to such
inclusion would not be an acceptance. Unless further negotiations took place in a timely
fashion, the exchange of forms would be conduct that creates a contract under subsection
(3). That contract would be composed of terms commonly used in that industry.
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